Subscription mechanisms for network formation.
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The purpose of this paper is to examine a model of network formation with costs where individual benefits from network formation are not known to the planner. A number of theorems and explanations is made for establishment of the proposed model. No numerical experiments are performed.
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Cites work
- A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
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Cited in
(19)- Realizing fair outcomes in minimum cost spanning tree problems through non-cooperative mechanisms
- Opportune moment strategies for a cost spanning tree game
- Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation
- The modified Banzhaf value for games with coalition structure: An axiomatic characterization.
- Forming efficient networks
- A note on network formation with decay
- The formation of networks with transfers among players
- Strongly stable networks
- Allocation rules for network games
- Listen before you link: optimal monitoring rules for communication networks
- Noncooperative cost spanning tree games with budget restrictions
- Networks and stability
- A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems
- Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments
- Implementation of welfare maximizing networks
- Link by consensus: formation of community networks
- Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games
- A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule
- Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value
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