Subscription mechanisms for network formation.

DOI10.1006/JETH.2001.2920MaRDI QIDQ1867527zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Suresh Mutuswami, Eyal Winter

Publication date 2 April 2003

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/a8e938f2e25b60a50ab88b3d7cd5673d5ff3cf6d

zbMATH Keywords

modelpayoffsNetworks mechanismplanner

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Recommendations

• Forming efficient networks
• A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation
• Optimal Efficiency Guarantees for Network Design Mechanisms
• New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms
• Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4172789 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation
• A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation
• A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
• A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division
• A strategic model of social and economic networks
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
• Stable networks

Cited in

(17)

• A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule
• Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value
• Realizing fair outcomes in minimum cost spanning tree problems through non-cooperative mechanisms
• Noncooperative cost spanning tree games with budget restrictions
• Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games
• The formation of networks with transfers among players
• Allocation rules for network games
• Strongly stable networks
• Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation
• Listen before you link: optimal monitoring rules for communication networks
• Opportune moment strategies for a cost spanning tree game
• A note on network formation with decay
• Forming efficient networks
• The modified Banzhaf value for games with coalition structure: An axiomatic characterization.
• Networks and stability
• A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems
• Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments

This page was built for publication: Subscription mechanisms for network formation.

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1867527)