A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2022.09.015OpenAlexW4296640215MaRDI QIDQ6164740FDOQ6164740

Authors: P. Hernández, Josep E. Peris, Juan J. Vidal-Puga 

Publication date: 4 July 2023

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2022.09.015

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zbMATH Keywords

game theorycost allocationsubgame perfect equilibriumminimum cost spanning tree

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

Cites Work

• Minimum cost spanning tree games
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• Sharing a minimal cost spanning tree: beyond the folk solution
• On the core and nucleolus of minimum cost spanning tree games
• On cost allocation for a spanning tree: A game theoretic approach
• Game theory. Translated from the Hebrew by Ziv Hellman and edited by Mike Borns
• Realizing fair outcomes in minimum cost spanning tree problems through non-cooperative mechanisms
• Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models
• A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems
• Minimum cost arborescences
• Axiomatization of the Shapley value on minimum cost spanning tree games
• Minimum cost spanning tree games and population monotonic allocation schemes.
• The optimistic \(TU\) game in minimum cost spanning tree problems
• Strategic sharing of a costly network
• On the core and nucleolus of directed acyclic graph games
• Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
• Subscription mechanisms for network formation.
• The price of imperfect competition for a spanning network
• Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value
• Submodularity of minimum-cost spanning tree games

Cited In (4)

• Algorithms for computing the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems with groups
• The folk rule through a painting procedure for minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources
• Two-stage Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Game under Fuzzy Optimistic Coalition
• A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems

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