Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games

DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0022-9zbMath1178.91033OpenAlexW1988199017MaRDI QIDQ850884

Francis Bloch, Matthew O. Jackson

Publication date: 7 November 2006

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0022-9

zbMATH Keywords

Game theoryNetworksEquilibriumBargainingNetwork gamesSide paymentsTransfers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Games involving graphs (91A43)

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