Coalitional games and contracts based on individual deviations

DOI10.1007/S11750-010-0149-5zbMATH Open1262.91029OpenAlexW2062544982MaRDI QIDQ1939062FDOQ1939062

Authors: Peter Borm, Bas van Velzen, Emiliya A. Lazarova 

Publication date: 26 February 2013

Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-010-0149-5

Recommendations

• Individual stability of coalition structures in three-person games
• Individual stability of coalition structures in three-person games
• Stable and efficient coalitional networks
• The cost of stability in coalitional games
• Coalition formation and stability

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycoalitional gamescontracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Constitutional rules of exclusion in jurisdiction formation
• The formation of networks with transfers among players
• Voting by Committees
• Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
• The Core of an Economy with Production
• A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
• The demand bargaining set: General characterization and application to majority games
• A bargaining set for monotonic simple games based on external and internal stability

Cited In (2)

• Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems
• Stable outcomes for contract choice problems

This page was built for publication: Coalitional games and contracts based on individual deviations

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1939062)