Coalitional games and contracts based on individual deviations

DOI10.1007/S11750-010-0149-5MaRDI QIDQ1939062zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Peter Borm, Bas van Velzen, Emiliya A. Lazarova

Publication date 26 February 2013

Published in Top (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-010-0149-5

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycoalitional gamescontracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Individual stability of coalition structures in three-person games
• Individual stability of coalition structures in three-person games
• Stable and efficient coalitional networks
• The cost of stability in coalitional games
• Coalition formation and stability

Cites work

• A bargaining set for monotonic simple games based on external and internal stability
• A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
• Constitutional rules of exclusion in jurisdiction formation
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
• The Core of an Economy with Production
• The demand bargaining set: General characterization and application to majority games
• The formation of networks with transfers among players
• Voting by Committees

Cited in

(2)

• Stable outcomes for contract choice problems
• Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems

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