Coalition formation and stability

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0123-1zbMath1138.91314OpenAlexW2061472540MaRDI QIDQ862533

José Alcalde, Antonio Romero-Medina

Publication date: 24 January 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5610

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

COALITION FORMATION GAMES: A SURVEY ⋮ Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities ⋮ Individual and group stability in neutral restrictions of hedonic games ⋮ Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods ⋮ The existence of a unique core partition in coalition formation games ⋮ Hedonic coalition formation games: a new stability notion ⋮ Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation ⋮ An empirical distribution of the number of subsets in the core partitions of hedonic games ⋮ Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations

Cites Work

• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation
• A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
• Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution