Individual and group stability in neutral restrictions of hedonic games

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2015.07.004zbMATH Open1331.91027arXiv1804.03315OpenAlexW1160128823MaRDI QIDQ899374FDOQ899374

Warut Suksompong

Publication date: 28 December 2015

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We consider a class of coalition formation games called hedonic games, i.e., games in which the utility of a player is completely determined by the coalition that the player belongs to. We first define the class of subset-additive hedonic games and show that they have the same representation power as the class of hedonic games. We then define a restriction of subset-additive hedonic games that we call subset-neutral hedonic games and generalize a result by Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) by showing the existence of a Nash stable partition and an individually stable partition in such games. We also consider neutrally anonymous hedonic games and show that they form a subclass of the subset-additive hedonic games. Finally, we show the existence of a core stable partition that is also individually stable in neutrally anonymous hedonic games by exhibiting an algorithm to compute such a partition.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.03315

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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Cited In (5)

• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Stability based on single-agent deviations in additively separable hedonic games
• On myopic stability concepts for hedonic games
• The core-partition of a hedonic game
• Topological distance games

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