The core-partition of a hedonic game
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2384878
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.05.007zbMath1283.91014MaRDI QIDQ2384878
Publication date: 10 October 2007
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/87
91A12: Cooperative games
Related Items
Rationing rules and stable coalition structures, Generating Empirical Core Size Distributions of Hedonic Games Using a Monte Carlo Method, On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to İnal (2015), Farsighted rationality in hedonic games, Subordinated hedonic games, Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices, Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities, Coalition formation with local public goods and group-size effect, Hedonic coalition formation games: a new stability notion, Bargaining cum voice, An empirical distribution of the number of subsets in the core partitions of hedonic games, Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations, Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities, Set-valued solution concepts using interval-type payoffs for interval games, Hedonic games related to many-to-one matching problems, Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players, A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE NON-EMPTINESS OF THE SOCIALLY STABLE CORE IN STRUCTURED TU-GAMES
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- The stability of hedonic coalition structures
- Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
- Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
- Cores of partitioning games
- Strongly balanced cooperative games
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
- On coalition formation: durable coalition structures.
- Coalition formation games with separable preferences.
- A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
- The partnered core of a game without side payments
- On myopic stability concepts for hedonic games
- Core in a simple coalition formation game
- Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games
- Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores
- Farsighted stability in hedonic games
- Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
- The Core of an N Person Game
- Some theorems on the core of ann-Game without Side-Payments
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
