A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
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Publication:1877166
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00261-8zbMATH Open1070.91009OpenAlexW3125789505MaRDI QIDQ1877166FDOQ1877166
Arkadi Predtetchinski, P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Publication date: 16 August 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00261-8
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Cites Work
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Cited In (36)
- Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores
- Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games
- Characterizations of the core of TU and NTU games with communication structures
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores
- Partially ordered cooperative games: Extended core and Shapley value
- A weak \(\alpha \)-core existence theorem of games with nonordered preferences and a continuum of agents
- How to efficiently allocate houses under price controls?
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for solutions of the Ky Fan minimax inequality and the non-emptiness of fuzzy cores in economies
- A weak \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem of generalized games with infinitely many players and pseudo-utilities
- The unbinding core for coalitional form games
- Negotiation, preferences over agreements, and the core
- Stable allocations of risk
- Efficiency, stability, and commitment in senior level job matching markets
- THE EXTENDED CORE OF A COOPERATIVE NTU GAME
- A note on the core
- A note on solution concepts for nontransferable utility games
- A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE NON-EMPTINESS OF THE SOCIALLY STABLE CORE IN STRUCTURED TU-GAMES
- Existence of fuzzy cores and generalizations of the K-K-M-S theorem
- Decomposing a balanced game: a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core
- Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility
- Non-emptiness of the fuzzy core in a finite production economy with infinite-dimensional commodity space
- Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach
- Allocation in multi-agenda disputes: a set-valued games approach
- Balancedness conditions for exact games
- Some infinite-player generalizations of Scarf's theorem: finite-coalition \(\alpha\)-cores and weak \(\alpha\)-cores
- Cooperative game with nondeterministic returns
- An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders
- On the non-emptiness of the fuzzy core
- A cooperative game with envy
- Socially structured games
- The core-partition of a hedonic game
- On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games
- The non-emptiness of the weak sequential core of a transferable utility game with uncertainty
- A necessary and sufficient condition for an NTU fuzzy game to have a non-empty fuzzy core
- A model of partnership formation
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