A necessary and sufficient condition for an NTU fuzzy game to have a non-empty fuzzy core

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2012.12.002MaRDI QIDQ1949014zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jiuqiang Liu, Xiaodong Liu

Publication date 25 April 2013

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.12.002

zbMATH Keywords

TU gamesNTU gamesbalanced collectionscoresFan's coincidence theorem\(\pi\)-balanced collections\(\Pi\)-balanced collectionsHeine-Borel finite cover theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
• A theorem on open coverings of a simplex and Scarf's core existence theorem through Brouwer's fixed point theorem
• Cooperative Fuzzy Games
• Extensions of two fixed point theorems of F. E. Browder
• Interpretation of Aubin's fuzzy coalitions and their extensions. Relaxation of finite exchange economies
• Models in Cooperative Game Theory
• On Kakutani's fixed point theorem, the K-K-M-S theorem and the core of a balanced game
• On some families of cooperative fuzzy games
• On the non-emptiness of the fuzzy core
• Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores
• Some theorems on the core of ann-Game without Side-Payments
• The Core of an N Person Game

Cited in

(11)

• Portfolio selection under higher moments using fuzzy multi-objective linear programming
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for solutions of the Ky Fan minimax inequality and the non-emptiness of fuzzy cores in economies
• Non-emptiness of the alpha-core: sufficient and necessary conditions
• A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
• A simple way to obtain the sufficient nonemptiness conditions for core of TU game
• Decomposing a balanced game: a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core
• Existence of fuzzy cores and generalizations of the K-K-M-S theorem
• Non-emptiness of the fuzzy core in a finite production economy with infinite-dimensional commodity space
• Existence of Edgeworth and competitive equilibria and fuzzy cores in coalition production economies
• Continuity and well-posedness of the fuzzy core for nontransferable utility fuzzy games
• Coalitional equilibria in coalitional abstract economies with nonordered preferences

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