A necessary and sufficient condition for an NTU fuzzy game to have a non-empty fuzzy core
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2012.12.002zbMATH Open1282.91034OpenAlexW2090470800MaRDI QIDQ1949014FDOQ1949014
Authors: Jiuqiang Liu, Xiaodong Liu 
Publication date: 25 April 2013
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.12.002
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Cites Work
- On Kakutani's fixed point theorem, the K-K-M-S theorem and the core of a balanced game
- A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
- The Core of an N Person Game
- Extensions of two fixed point theorems of F. E. Browder
- Models in Cooperative Game Theory
- Cooperative Fuzzy Games
- Interpretation of Aubin's fuzzy coalitions and their extensions. Relaxation of finite exchange economies
- A theorem on open coverings of a simplex and Scarf's core existence theorem through Brouwer's fixed point theorem
- On some families of cooperative fuzzy games
- Some theorems on the core of ann-Game without Side-Payments
- Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores
- On the non-emptiness of the fuzzy core
Cited In (10)
- Portfolio selection under higher moments using fuzzy multi-objective linear programming
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for solutions of the Ky Fan minimax inequality and the non-emptiness of fuzzy cores in economies
- Non-emptiness of the alpha-core: sufficient and necessary conditions
- A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
- A simple way to obtain the sufficient nonemptiness conditions for core of TU game
- Existence of fuzzy cores and generalizations of the K-K-M-S theorem
- Decomposing a balanced game: a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core
- Non-emptiness of the fuzzy core in a finite production economy with infinite-dimensional commodity space
- Existence of Edgeworth and competitive equilibria and fuzzy cores in coalition production economies
- Coalitional equilibria in coalitional abstract economies with nonordered preferences
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