Socially structured games
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Publication:2370085
DOI10.1007/S11238-006-9007-1zbMATH Open1142.91325OpenAlexW2161171579MaRDI QIDQ2370085FDOQ2370085
Authors: Gerard van der Laan, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Dolf Talman 
Publication date: 21 June 2007
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-006-9007-1
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Cites Work
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- An extremely simple proof of the K-K-M-S theorem
- A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
- Alternative Version of Shapley's Theorem on Closed Coverings of a Simplex
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Allocation rules for network games
- The positional power of nodes in digraphs
- Ranking the Participants in a Tournament
- The Shapley value for \(n\)-person games in generalized characteristic function form
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
- The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
- Some theorems on the core of ann-Game without Side-Payments
- Intersection theorems on polytopes.
- Cooperative games in permutational structure
Cited In (6)
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