Socially structured games

DOI10.1007/S11238-006-9007-1MaRDI QIDQ2370085zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gerard van der Laan, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Dolf Talman

Publication date 21 June 2007

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-006-9007-1

zbMATH Keywords

balancednesscorenon-transferable utility gamesocial stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games
• A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE NON-EMPTINESS OF THE SOCIALLY STABLE CORE IN STRUCTURED TU-GAMES
• Cooperative games in permutational structure
• On the structure of the core of balanced games.
• The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: a note

Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
• A strategic model of social and economic networks
• Allocation rules for network games
• Alternative Version of Shapley's Theorem on Closed Coverings of a Simplex
• An extremely simple proof of the K-K-M-S theorem
• Cooperative games in permutational structure
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3625415 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3422228 (Why is no real title available?)
• Intersection theorems on polytopes.
• Ranking the Participants in a Tournament
• Some theorems on the core of ann-Game without Side-Payments
• The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
• The positional power of nodes in digraphs
• The Shapley value for n-person games in generalized characteristic function form
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments

Cited in

(7)

• A note on the core
• The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games
• Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores
• The Social Ultimatum Game
• A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE NON-EMPTINESS OF THE SOCIALLY STABLE CORE IN STRUCTURED TU-GAMES
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7356860 (Why is no real title available?)
• The existence and Hadamard well-posedness of cooperative equilibria for discontinuous socially structured games

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