The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: a note

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2004.10.002zbMATH Open1129.91005OpenAlexW2059260651MaRDI QIDQ817262FDOQ817262

Authors Anindya Bhattacharya, Abderrahmane Ziad

Publication date 8 March 2006

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.002

zbMATH Keywords

coreNTU gamesindirect domination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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• A property of the core
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099360 (Why is no real title available?)
• A property of the core
• A stochastic bargaining process for \(n\)-person games
• An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value
• An admissible set occurring in various bargaining situations
• The Core of an N Person Game
• The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process
• The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games

Cited in

(6)

• Socially structured games
• On the characterizations of viable proposals
• The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games
• Associated games to optimize the core of a transferable utility game
• Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4079201 (Why is no real title available?)

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