The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: a note
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Publication:817262
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.002zbMath1129.91005MaRDI QIDQ817262
Anindya Bhattacharya, Abderrahmane Ziad
Publication date: 8 March 2006
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.002
91A12: Cooperative games
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