A property of the core

DOI10.1006/game.1996.0017zbMath0848.90145OpenAlexW2084342991MaRDI QIDQ1915703

Abhijit Sengupta, Kunal Sengupta

Publication date: 1 July 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0017

zbMATH Keywords

nonempty coretransferable utility game in coalitional form

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (20)

On the characterizations of viable proposals ⋮ The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks ⋮ Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem ⋮ Coalition formation as a dynamic process. ⋮ Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness ⋮ Stochastic stability in assignment problems ⋮ On the number of blocks required to access the core ⋮ An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games ⋮ A general characterization for non-balanced games in terms of \(U\)-cycles ⋮ The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension ⋮ Robust dynamic cooperative games ⋮ On the accessibility of the core ⋮ Random paths to stability in the roommate problem ⋮ The coalition structure core is accessible ⋮ Accessible outcomes versus absorbing outcomes ⋮ The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games ⋮ The strategy structure of some coalition formation games ⋮ On the accessibility of core-extensions ⋮ Associated games to optimize the core of a transferable utility game ⋮ The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: a note

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