An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.008zbMath1281.91014OpenAlexW2051778230MaRDI QIDQ2435888

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal

Publication date: 21 February 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.008

zbMATH Keywords

accessibilityweak dominancecoreoptimal boundTU-games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (4)

On the characterizations of viable proposals ⋮ Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core ⋮ Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem ⋮ The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games

Cites Work

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• On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP
• Cooperative games with large cores
• A property of the core
• Cores of convex games
• Cores of exact games. I
• Credible coalitions and the core
• The kernel of a cooperative game

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