Note: Remarks on theory of the core

DOI10.1002/1520-6750(200008)47:5%3C455::AID-NAV6%3E3.0.CO;2-DMaRDI QIDQ4511448zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Chih Chang

Publication date 13 July 2003

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1002/1520-6750(200008)47:5%3C455::aid-nav6%3E3.0.co;2-d

zbMATH Keywords

Bondareva-Shapley theoremcore of cooperative gamesintersection coretransferable utilityundominated core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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• Dual cores and effectivity functions
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• Two remarks on the inner core
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• A note on the core
• The unbinding core for coalitional form games
• On extensions of the core and the anticore of transferable utility games
• The finagle point might not be within the -core
• An experiment on a core controversy
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• A sufficient condition for the coincidence of the core of a cooperative game with its solution
• A Short Note on Containment of Cores
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• Cooperative games under interval uncertainty: on the convexity of the interval undominated cores
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• Coincidence theorem and the inner core
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• The relative interior of the base polyhedron and the core
• On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to İnal (2015)
• Two solutions on TU games with preference relations: the core and the globally stable solution
• The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: a note
• Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-core
• A note on isomorphism and strategic equivalence of cooperative games

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