Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-core

DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0062-1zbMath1131.91009OpenAlexW2074552430MaRDI QIDQ878163

Carles Rafels, Francesc Llerena

Publication date: 26 April 2007

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0062-1

zbMATH Keywords

corecooperative TU-gamereasonable outcomesundominated imputations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (5)

Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results ⋮ Feasibility-free axiomatization of the core and its non-empty extension ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency ⋮ A new approach of cooperative interval games: the interval core and Shapley value revisited ⋮ On the importance of reduced games in axiomatizing core extensions

Cites Work

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• Axiomatizations of the core on the universal domain and other natural domains
• The vector lattice structure of the \(n\)-person TU games
• Cores of convex games
• THE POSITIVE PREKERNEL OF A COOPERATIVE GAME
• THE CORE AND CONSISTENCY PROPERTIES: A GENERAL CHARACTERISATION
• A Survey of Consistency Properties in Cooperative Game Theory
• Note: Remarks on theory of the core
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games

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