An axiomatization of the core of a cooperative game
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Publication:899736
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(86)90155-2zbMATH Open1328.91024OpenAlexW2043287023MaRDI QIDQ899736FDOQ899736
Authors: Hans Keiding 
Publication date: 1 January 2016
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(86)90155-2
Cites Work
Cited In (22)
- The bounded core for games with restricted cooperation
- An intersection theorem in TU cooperative game theory
- A union self-evaluation approach to associated consistency for cooperative games
- Feasibility-free axiomatization of the core and its non-empty extension
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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- An axiomatic characterization of coalitionally stable solutions for the games in normal form
- A fundamental study for partially defined cooperative games
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- Axiomatizing core extensions
- Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-core
- An axiomatization of the core of games with restricted cooperation
- Balanced contributions axiom in the solution of cooperative games
- Cooperative games with a simplicial core
- An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value for cooperative games on antimatroids
- The positive prekernel of a cooperative game
- Core of Coalition Games on MV-algebras
- The extended core of a cooperative NTU game
- The kernel for reasonable outcomes in a cooperative game
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitive prices
- On the importance of reduced games in axiomatizing core extensions
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