Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitive prices

DOI10.1007/s11750-016-0409-0zbMath1361.91048OpenAlexW2271098891MaRDI QIDQ518442

Marina Núñez, Francesc Llerena, Ata Atay

Publication date: 28 March 2017

Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/106682

zbMATH Keywords

consistencycorecompetitive pricesmulti-sided assignment market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multisectoral models in economics (91B66) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Matching markets with middlemen under transferable utility ⋮ Multi-sided assignment games on \(m\)-partite graphs

Cites Work

• The maximum and the addition of assignment games
• An axiomatization of the nucleolus
• Axiomatization of the core of assignment games
• An axiomatization of the core of a cooperative game
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Cores of partitioning games
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for balancedness in partitioning games
• The core of an \(m\)-sided assignment game
• The supplier-firm-buyer game and its \(m\)-sided generalization
• Axiomatizations of the core on the universal domain and other natural domains
• Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems
• An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets
• Complements and substitutes in generalized multisided assignment economies
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

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