THE EXTENDED CORE OF A COOPERATIVE NTU GAME

DOI10.1142/S0219198910002660zbMath1209.91032MaRDI QIDQ5392796

Ya. B. Pankratova, Hans Keiding

Publication date: 14 April 2011

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesaxiomatizationNTU gamesextensive core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (2)

Supermodular NTU-games ⋮ USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION

Cites Work

• Core extensions for non-balanced TU-games
• An axiomatization of the core of a cooperative game
• An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments
• The core of a cooperative game without side payments
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Axiomatizations of the core on the universal domain and other natural domains
• The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in sidepayment games
• A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
• The Core of an N Person Game

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