On the cores of cooperative games and the stability of the Weber set

DOI10.1007/S001820050048MaRDI QIDQ1376988zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Carles Rafels, Stef Tijs

Publication date 1 February 1998

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/14435da8-14ce-4845-8e54-45dafb7578e1

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityconvexityWeber set\(D\)-core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• The core cover in relation to the nucleolus and the Weber set
• On the core, the Weber set and convexity in games with a priori unions
• New necessary conditions for the stability of the core in cooperative games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4077005
• Stable cores of large games

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139280 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 41329 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099364 (Why is no real title available?)
• A short proof of the inclusion of the core in the Weber set
• Cores of convex games

Cited in

(20)

• On dominance core and stable sets for cooperative ellipsoidal games
• An analysis of stability sets in pure coordination games
• A sufficient condition for the coincidence of the core of a cooperative game with its solution
• Stable sets and cores for multi-criteria simple games and for their extensions
• On the Harsanyi payoff vectors and Harsanyi imputations
• A note on external angles of the core of convex TU games, marginal worth vectors and the Weber set
• On the core, the Weber set and convexity in games with a priori unions
• A characterization of convex games by means of bargaining sets
• New necessary conditions for the stability of the core in cooperative games
• Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-core
• The core cover in relation to the nucleolus and the Weber set
• Cooperative games under interval uncertainty: on the convexity of the interval undominated cores
• A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2047433 (Why is no real title available?)
• On cores and stable sets for fuzzy games
• Stable sets and max-convex decompositions of TU games
• A note on isomorphism and strategic equivalence of cooperative games
• A short proof of the inclusion of the core in the Weber set
• Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games
• The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: a note

This page was built for publication: On the cores of cooperative games and the stability of the Weber set

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1376988)