On the cores of cooperative games and the stability of the Weber set

DOI10.1007/S001820050048zbMATH Open0888.90170OpenAlexW1972256150MaRDI QIDQ1376988FDOQ1376988

Authors: Carles Rafels, Stef Tijs 

Publication date: 1 February 1998

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/14435da8-14ce-4845-8e54-45dafb7578e1

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zbMATH Keywords

stabilityconvexityWeber set\(D\)-core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Cores of convex games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A short proof of the inclusion of the core in the Weber set

Cited In (20)

• A sufficient condition for the coincidence of the core of a cooperative game with its solution
• Stable sets and cores for multi-criteria simple games and for their extensions
• On the Harsanyi payoff vectors and Harsanyi imputations
• A note on external angles of the core of convex TU games, marginal worth vectors and the Weber set
• On the core, the Weber set and convexity in games with a priori unions
• A characterization of convex games by means of bargaining sets
• New necessary conditions for the stability of the core in cooperative games
• The core cover in relation to the nucleolus and the Weber set
• Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-core
• Cooperative games under interval uncertainty: on the convexity of the interval undominated cores
• A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On cores and stable sets for fuzzy games
• Stable sets and max-convex decompositions of TU games
• A note on isomorphism and strategic equivalence of cooperative games
• A short proof of the inclusion of the core in the Weber set
• Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games
• The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: a note
• On dominance core and stable sets for cooperative ellipsoidal games
• An analysis of stability sets in pure coordination games

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