On the core, the Weber set and convexity in games with a priori unions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:958089
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2007.11.037zbMath1152.91010MaRDI QIDQ958089
Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano, Manuel A. Pulido
Publication date: 2 December 2008
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2007.11.037
91A12: Cooperative games
Related Items
Construct the stable vendor managed inventory partnership through a profit-sharing approach, Characterizations of the core of TU and NTU games with communication structures, The minimum sum representation as an index of voting power, Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility, The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure, The value of cooperation in interregional transmission planning: a noncooperative equilibrium model approach, The bargaining set for almost-convex games, An axiomatic approach in minimum cost spanning tree problems with groups
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Configuration values: Extensions of the coalitional Owen value
- On the reduced game property and its converse
- A value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation
- Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP
- The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition structure
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- Owen's coalitional value and aircraft landing fees
- A new axiomatization of the Owen value for games with coalition structures
- Minimarg and maximarg operators
- An extension of the \(\tau\)-value to games with coalition structures.
- Characterization of the core in games with restricted cooperation
- Owen coalitional value without additivity axiom
- Cores of convex games
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- Cores of games with restricted cooperation
- The Consistent Coalitional Value
