Configuration values: Extensions of the coalitional Owen value
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Publication:863262
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.08.016zbMATH Open1153.91319OpenAlexW2089523646MaRDI QIDQ863262FDOQ863262
J. Aurrecoechea, M. J. Albizuri, José M. Zarzuelo
Publication date: 26 January 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.016
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Cites Work
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- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
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- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- On weighted Shapley values
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
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Cited In (22)
- NONEMPTY CORE-TYPE SOLUTIONS OVER BALANCED COALITIONS IN TU-GAMES
- The average tree solution for multi-choice forest games
- Owen coalitional value without additivity axiom
- Constitutions and groups
- A new integrated cooperative game and optimization model for the allocation of forest resources
- On the core, the Weber set and convexity in games with a priori unions
- The multichoice coalition value
- Collaborative transportation with overlapping coalitions
- Paths to stability for overlapping group structures
- Graphs and (levels of) cooperation in games: two ways how to allocate the surplus
- Rough Shapley functions for games with a priori unions
- Implementing generating functions to obtain power indices with coalition configuration
- Bargaining and membership
- An axiomatization of probabilistic Owen value for games with coalition structure
- Coalition Configurations and the Public Good Index
- Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities
- Values and coalition configurations
- On the meaning of Owen-Banzhaf coalitional value in voting situations
- Coalition configurations and share functions
- Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure
- A study on profit distribution for water rights cooperation taking into account dominant power of transfer sectors
- Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks
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