Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks
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Publication:2628295
DOI10.1007/s11238-016-9574-8zbMath1395.91016OpenAlexW2531488237MaRDI QIDQ2628295
Publication date: 1 June 2017
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/96628/files/NDL2010-116.pdf
Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (2)
Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities ⋮ The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration
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