Implementing generating functions to obtain power indices with coalition configuration
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Abstract: We consider the Banzhaf-Coleman and Owen power indices for weighted majority games modified by a coalition configuration. We present calculation algorithms of them that make use of the method of generating functions. We programmed the procedure in the open language R and it is illustrated by a real life example taken from social sciences.
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3839628 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3813385 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614541 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- Coalition configurations and share functions
- Coalition configurations and the Banzhaf index
- Computing power indices in weighted multiple majority games.
- Configuration values: Extensions of the coalitional Owen value
- Dimension of complete simple games with minimum
- Generating functions for coalitional power indices: an application to the IMF
- Multilinear Extensions of Games
- Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
- The distribution of power in the European constitution
- Values and coalition configurations
- Voting power in the European Union enlargement
- Weighted multiple majority games with unions: generating functions and applications to the European Union
Cited in
(7)- Generating functions for coalitional power indices: an application to the IMF
- Generating functions of weighted voting games, MacMahon's partition analysis, and Clifford algebras
- An approach via generating functions to compute power indices of multiple weighted voting games with incompatible players
- A generating functions approach for computing the public good index efficiently
- Coalition configurations and the Banzhaf index
- Axiomatizing the public good index via merging and new arrival properties
- Voting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the council of the European Union
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