Implementing generating functions to obtain power indices with coalition configuration
DOI10.1016/J.DAM.2016.06.010zbMATH Open1414.91033arXiv1507.00216OpenAlexW2964079182MaRDI QIDQ317392FDOQ317392
Authors: G. I. Novoa-Flores, J. Rodríguez-Veiga, B. Casas-Méndez
Publication date: 30 September 2016
Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1507.00216
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generating functionspower indicesweighted majority gamesBanzhaf-Coleman indexcoalition configurationShapley-Shubik indexweighted multiple majority games
Cites Work
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- Dimension of complete simple games with minimum
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- Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
- Multilinear Extensions of Games
- Weighted multiple majority games with unions: generating functions and applications to the European Union
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- Voting power in the European Union enlargement
- Values and coalition configurations
- Coalition configurations and share functions
- Coalition configurations and the Banzhaf index
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- Generating functions for coalitional power indices: an application to the IMF
- The distribution of power in the European constitution
- Configuration values: Extensions of the coalitional Owen value
Cited In (6)
- An approach via generating functions to compute power indices of multiple weighted voting games with incompatible players
- Generating functions for coalitional power indices: an application to the IMF
- Generating Functions of Weighted Voting Games, MacMahon’s Partition Analysis, and Clifford Algebras
- Voting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the council of the European Union
- Axiomatizing the public good index via merging and new arrival properties
- Coalition configurations and the Banzhaf index
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