Implementing generating functions to obtain power indices with coalition configuration
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Publication:317392
DOI10.1016/j.dam.2016.06.010zbMath1414.91033arXiv1507.00216OpenAlexW2964079182MaRDI QIDQ317392
J. Rodríguez-Veiga, G. I. Novoa-Flores, Balbina V. Casas Méndez
Publication date: 30 September 2016
Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1507.00216
generating functionsweighted majority gamespower indicesBanzhaf-Coleman indexcoalition configurationShapley-Shubik indexweighted multiple majority games
Related Items (4)
Axiomatizing the public good index via merging and new arrival properties ⋮ An approach via generating functions to compute power indices of multiple weighted voting games with incompatible players ⋮ Generating Functions of Weighted Voting Games, MacMahon’s Partition Analysis, and Clifford Algebras ⋮ Voting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the council of the European Union
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