Values and coalition configurations
The authors study a new class of values for TU games \((N,v)\), called the \textit{weighted bounded configuration values}. These values \(\Phi^{\omega,{\mathcal B}}(v)\) are defined (in a special way) with the help of two parameters, \({\mathcal B}\) and \(\omega\), where \({\mathcal B} = \{{\mathcal B}_1,\ldots, {\mathcal B}_m\}\) is a family of different subsets of \(N\) such that \(\cup_{i=1}^m {\mathcal B}_i=N\) and \(\omega\) is a vector with positive components indexed by the pairs \((i,{\mathcal B}_q)\) with \(i\in N\) and \({\mathcal B}_q\in {\mathcal B}\) satisfying \(i\in {\mathcal B}_q\). Several axiomatizations of the value \(\Phi^{\omega,{\mathcal B}}(v)\) are given with the help of such standard properties like efficiency, linearity, partnership additivity and null player out. The weighted bounded configuration values generalize (in some way) the Shapley value, the Oven value and the weighted coalition structure values earlier studied by \textit{A. Levy} and \textit{R. P. McLean} [Games Econ. Behav. 1, No. 3, 234--249 (1989; Zbl 0753.90079)].
- A group bargaining solution
- Bargaining and membership
- Bargaining and Value
- Coalition configurations and the Banzhaf index
- Configuration values: Extensions of the coalitional Owen value
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614541 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- On weighted Shapley values
- Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
- The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure
- The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions
- Weighted coalition structure values
- Weighted coalition structure values
- Coalition configurations and share functions
- Coalition configurations and the Banzhaf index
- Implementing generating functions to obtain power indices with coalition configuration
- The Consistent Coalitional Value
- A new integrated cooperative game and optimization model for the allocation of forest resources
- The generalized position values for communication games with coalition configuration
- Flow methods for cooperative games with generalized coalition configuration
- Collaborative transportation with overlapping coalitions
- Configuration values: Extensions of the coalitional Owen value
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