scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3813385

zbMATH Open0514.90096MaRDI QIDQ3661354FDOQ3661354

Authors: William F. Lucas 

Publication date: 1983

Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)

zbMATH Keywords

simple gamescoherent systemsweighted votingBanzhaf-Coleman indexfair divisionShapley-Shubik indexChow parametersmeasuring political power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to operations research and mathematical programming (90-01)

Cited In (24)

• The Banzhaf Index for Multicandidate Presidential Elections
• A generating functions approach for computing the public good index efficiently
• Computing power indices in weighted multiple majority games.
• A class of non-normalized power indices for simple games
• The Banzhaf index in representative systems with multiple political parties
• Creating an acceptable consensus ranking for group decision making
• Computing Banzhaf-Coleman and Shapley-Shubik power indices with incompatible players
• Generating functions for computing power indices efficiently
• Power indices in a discretely proportional representative system with a large number of voters
• Implementing generating functions to obtain power indices with coalition configuration
• Weighted multiple majority games with unions: generating functions and applications to the European Union
• Designing the allocation of emergency units by using the Shapley-Shubik power index: A case study
• Generating Functions of Weighted Voting Games, MacMahon’s Partition Analysis, and Clifford Algebras
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Voting power in the European Union enlargement
• Computation of several power indices by generating functions
• NP-completeness for calculating power indices of weighted majority games
• The Banzhaf power index for political games
• Staying power in sequential games
• Voting power and at-large representation.
• Monte Carlo methods for the Shapley-Shubik power index
• Strategy-proof popular mechanisms
• Power, prices, and incomes in voting systems
• A Review of Some Recent Results on Power Indices

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