scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3813385
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Publication:3661354
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(26)- Weighted multiple majority games with unions: generating functions and applications to the European Union
- Staying power in sequential games
- A class of non-normalized power indices for simple games
- The Banzhaf power index for political games
- The Banzhaf index in representative systems with multiple political parties
- Designing the allocation of emergency units by using the Shapley-Shubik power index: A case study
- Computing power indices in weighted multiple majority games.
- Voting power and at-large representation.
- Voting power in the European Union enlargement
- Monte Carlo methods for the Shapley-Shubik power index
- Strategy-proof popular mechanisms
- Computation of several power indices by generating functions
- Computing Banzhaf-Coleman and Shapley-Shubik power indices with incompatible players
- Implementing generating functions to obtain power indices with coalition configuration
- The Banzhaf Index for Multicandidate Presidential Elections
- Power, prices, and incomes in voting systems
- A generating functions approach for computing the public good index efficiently
- A review of some recent results on power indices
- Generating functions of weighted voting games, MacMahon's partition analysis, and Clifford algebras
- Power analysis of voting by count and account
- Generating functions for computing power indices efficiently
- NP-completeness for calculating power indices of weighted majority games
- On generating functions to compute some power measures for weighted majority games
- Apportionment when seats are allocated in lots. The D'Hondt method case and political implications
- Creating an acceptable consensus ranking for group decision making
- Power indices in a discretely proportional representative system with a large number of voters
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