Power, prices, and incomes in voting systems

DOI10.1007/BF01588961zbMath0384.90115MaRDI QIDQ4165187

H. Peyton Young

Publication date: 1978

Published in: Mathematical Programming (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (5)

Disadvantageous syndicates and stable cartels: The case of the nucleolus ⋮ A simple ``market value bargaining model for weighted voting games: characterization and limit theorems ⋮ Sequential legislative lobbying ⋮ Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with an Application to False-name Manipulation ⋮ Interval measures of power

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Power, prices, and incomes in voting systems