A simple ``market value bargaining model for weighted voting games: characterization and limit theorems

DOI10.1007/S00182-006-0055-0MaRDI QIDQ863403zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Guillermo Owen, Ines Lindner, Scott L. Feld, Bernard Grofman, Leonard Ray

Publication date 26 January 2007

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/25999

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingmarket valuesvotingweighted voting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
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• Interval measures of power
• L. S. Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special cases.
• Parliamentary Coalitions: A Tour of Models
• Power, prices, and incomes in voting systems
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
• Weighted voting, multicameral representation, and power

Cited in

(2)

• A stochastic model for the Shapley value.
• The bargaining set for sharing the power

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