Average weights and power in weighted voting games
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Publication:2019323
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2020.04.002zbMATH Open1461.91019arXiv1905.04261OpenAlexW3024782554MaRDI QIDQ2019323FDOQ2019323
Authors: Daria Boratyn, Werner Kirsch, Wojciech Słomczyński, Dariusz Stolicki, Karol Życzkowski
Publication date: 26 April 2021
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We investigate a class of weighted voting games for which weights are randomly distributed over the standard probability simplex. We provide close-formed formulae for the expectation and density of the distribution of weight of the -th largest player under the uniform distribution. We analyze the average voting power of the -th largest player and its dependence on the quota, obtaining analytical and numerical results for small values of and a general theorem about the functional form of the relation between the average Penrose--Banzhaf power index and the quota for the uniform measure on the simplex. We also analyze the power of a collectivity to act (Coleman efficiency index) of random weighted voting games, obtaining analytical upper bounds therefor.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.04261
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order statisticsvoting powerPenrose-Banzhaf indexColeman efficiency indexrandom weighted voting games
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Cited In (16)
- Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games: Some Further Results
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