On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games

DOI10.1007/S00355-012-0683-1zbMATH Open1288.91014OpenAlexW2085015962MaRDI QIDQ2453422FDOQ2453422

Authors: Fabrice Barthélémy, Dominique Lepelley, Mathieu Martin 

Publication date: 6 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/documents/2011-17.pdf

Recommendations

• Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games: Some Further Results
• A CLASS OF MAJORITY GAMES
• Average weights and power in weighted voting games
• Easy weighted majority games
• The weighted majority game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
• Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Polynômes arithmétiques et méthode des polyedres en combinatoire
• Integer points in polyhedra
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic

Cited In (2)

• Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games: Some Further Results
• Average weights and power in weighted voting games

This page was built for publication: On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2453422)