scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5773528

MaRDI QIDQ3585501zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Ines Linder

Publication date 19 August 2010

Full work available at URL http://www.sub.uni-hamburg.de/opus/volltexte/2004/2222/pdf/Dissertation.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

generating functionCondorcet jury theorem\(q\)-chainscomplaisancemajor votersPenrose's limit theoremreplicative

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited in

(9)

• Average weights and power in weighted voting games
• A toy model of a weighted voting game including two strong players
• A special case of Penrose's limit theorem when abstention is allowed
• L S Penrose's limit theorem: tests by simulation
• A simple ``market value bargaining model for weighted voting games: characterization and limit theorems
• A note on limit results for the Penrose-Banzhaf index
• Cases where the Penrose limit theorem does not hold
• The power of a collectivity to act in weighted voting games with many small voters
• L. S. Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special cases.

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