scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5773528
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Publication:3585501
zbMATH Open1197.91001MaRDI QIDQ3585501FDOQ3585501
Authors: Ines Linder 
Publication date: 19 August 2010
Full work available at URL: http://www.sub.uni-hamburg.de/opus/volltexte/2004/2222/pdf/Dissertation.pdf
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generating functionCondorcet jury theorem\(q\)-chainscomplaisancemajor votersPenrose's limit theoremreplicative
Cooperative games (91A12) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Voting theory (91B12)
Cited In (9)
- L S Penrose's limit theorem: tests by simulation
- The power of a collectivity to act in weighted voting games with many small voters
- A simple ``market value bargaining model for weighted voting games: characterization and limit theorems
- L. S. Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special cases.
- Average weights and power in weighted voting games
- Cases where the Penrose limit theorem does not hold
- A special case of Penrose's limit theorem when abstention is allowed
- A note on limit results for the Penrose-Banzhaf index
- A toy model of a weighted voting game including two strong players
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