Computing power indices in weighted multiple majority games.
From MaRDI portal
The authors present a method of computing the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index efficiently by using generating functions for weighted multiple majority games and analyze its temporal complexity. See also the articles by \textit{S. J. Brams} and \textit{Affuso} [Theory and Decision 7, 29--56 (1976)] and \textit{A. Tannenbaum} [The Mathematica Journal 7, 58--63 (1997)] in this connection. The authors also apply the algorithms obtained to compute both the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index under the two decision rules adopted in the Nice European Union Summit.
Recommendations
- Efficient Computation of Power Indices for Weighted Majority Games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1766750
- Complexity results for calculating power indices of weighted majority games
- A method for evaluating the behavior of power indices in weighted plurality games
- NP-completeness for calculating power indices of weighted majority games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7526435
- Power indices of simple games and vector-weighted majority games by means of binary decision diagrams
- The power indices for multi-choice multi-valued games
- Computing power indices for large voting games
- Power indices for multicandidate voting games
Cites work
Cited in
(48)- Weighted multiple majority games with unions: generating functions and applications to the European Union
- On calculation of the power indices with allowance for the agent preferences
- Algorithm for automatic computation of the power variations in share tradings
- Faster algorithms for computing power indices in weighted voting games
- Voting power in the European Union enlargement
- Complementary cooperation, minimal winning coalitions, and power indices
- Dynamic programming algorithms for computing power indices in weighted multi-tier games
- Voting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the council of the European Union
- Implicit power indices for measuring indirect control in corporate structures
- Sampling methods to estimate the Banzhaf-Owen value
- An approach via generating functions to compute power indices of multiple weighted voting games with incompatible players
- A linear approximation method for the Shapley value
- The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision
- Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions
- Sharing costs in highways: a game theoretic approach
- Dynamic programming for computing power indices for weighted voting games with precoalitions
- On stratified sampling for estimating coalitional values
- Complexity results for calculating power indices of weighted majority games
- Some open problems in simple games
- Computing power indices for large voting games
- On the inverse power index problem
- Implementing generating functions to obtain power indices with coalition configuration
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5773528 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2073358 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1766750 (Why is no real title available?)
- A generating functions approach for computing the public good index efficiently
- On the nucleolus as a power index
- Confidence intervals for the Shapley-Shubik power index in Markovian games
- Efficient Computation of Power Indices for Weighted Majority Games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1423500 (Why is no real title available?)
- Characterizations of power indices based on null player free winning coalitions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7526435 (Why is no real title available?)
- Generating functions of weighted voting games, MacMahon's partition analysis, and Clifford algebras
- Power indices of simple games and vector-weighted majority games by means of binary decision diagrams
- Equal representation in two-tier voting systems
- Finding optimal solutions for voting game design problems
- NP-completeness for calculating power indices of weighted majority games
- The Shapley-Shubik index for multi-criteria simple games
- Multicameral voting cohesion games
- Mergeable weighted majority games and characterizations of some power indices
- Analyzing the Zerkani network with the Owen value
- On generating functions to compute some power measures for weighted majority games
- A general model for multi-parameter weighted voting games
- Banzhaf index for multiple voting systems. An application to the European Union
- Generating functions for coalitional power indices: an application to the IMF
- The distribution of power in the European constitution
- The complexity of power indexes with graph restricted coalitions
- Forms of representation for simple games: sizes, conversions and equivalences
This page was built for publication: Computing power indices in weighted multiple majority games.
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1402487)
