Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions
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Publication:2453423
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Cites work
- A new index of power for simple n-person games
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Cited in
(23)- On calculation of the power indices with allowance for the agent preferences
- Minimal-axiom characterizations of the Coleman and Banzhaf indices of voting power
- A measure of aggregate power in organizations
- Interval measures of power
- The Banzhaf power index on convex geometries
- Representation-compatible power indices
- Clan information market games
- Implicit power indices for measuring indirect control in corporate structures
- Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory
- Power indices and minimal winning coalitions
- On the structure of minimal winning coalitions in simple voting games
- An approach via generating functions to compute power indices of multiple weighted voting games with incompatible players
- On the meaning of Owen-Banzhaf coalitional value in voting situations
- An asymmetric Shapley-Shubik power index
- The minimum sum representation as an index of voting power
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3932826 (Why is no real title available?)
- Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
- SEMIVALUES AND VOTING POWER
- Power, cooperation indices and coalition structures
- An improvement of the Deegan-Packle index in a voting game
- Entering of newcomer in the perturbed voting game
- Generating functions for coalitional power indices: an application to the IMF
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