Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions

DOI10.1007/s00355-012-0685-zzbMath1288.91016OpenAlexW2289971701MaRDI QIDQ2453423

Fabien Lange, László Á. Kóczy

Publication date: 6 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://real.mtak.hu/7031/7/Lange-K%C3%B3czy_Power%20indices...SCW.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

Implicit power indices for measuring indirect control in corporate structures ⋮ Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory ⋮ Clan information market games ⋮ An approach via generating functions to compute power indices of multiple weighted voting games with incompatible players

Cites Work

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• Power indices and minimal winning coalitions
• How to share when context matters: the Möbius value as a generalized solution for cooperative games
• Equivalent Representations of Set Functions
• Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf Indices Revisited
• Values of Graph-Restricted Games
• Value Theory Without Efficiency
• A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game
• [https://portal.mardi4nfdi.de/wiki/Publication:5731810 On the foundations of combinatorial theory I. Theory of M�bius Functions]

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