How to share when context matters: the Möbius value as a generalized solution for cooperative games

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2004.12.008zbMATH Open1138.91007OpenAlexW2077305897MaRDI QIDQ2581297FDOQ2581297

Authors: Antoine Billot, Jacques-François Thisse 

Publication date: 9 January 2006

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.12.008

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zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuequasivalueMöbius inverse

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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Cited In (6)

• Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution
• Parallel axiomatizations of weighted and multiweighted Shapley values, random order values, and the Harsanyi set
• The Shapley value, the proper Shapley value, and sharing rules for cooperative ventures
• On Harsanyi dividends and asymmetric values
• On proper Shapley values for monotone TU-games
• Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions

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