How to share when context matters: the Möbius value as a generalized solution for cooperative games
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Publication:2581297
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.12.008zbMath1138.91007OpenAlexW2077305897MaRDI QIDQ2581297
Antoine Billot, Jacques-François Thisse
Publication date: 9 January 2006
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.12.008
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