The Shapley value, the proper Shapley value, and sharing rules for cooperative ventures

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2019.11.003MaRDI QIDQ2294529zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors M. Zelený, René van den Brink, René Levínský

Publication date 11 February 2020

Published in Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/16df7b51-66db-438a-a363-0171af3601b1

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative venture gameequity principleproper Shapley valueShapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research, mathematical programming (90-XX)

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Cites work

• A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
• A Game Theoretic Approach to Problems in Telecommunication
• Axiomatizations of the proportional Shapley value
• Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods
• How to share when context matters: the Möbius value as a generalized solution for cooperative games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650245 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3138565 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1474748 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• On proper Shapley values for monotone TU-games
• The proportional Shapley value and applications
• The proportional solution for rights problems
• The proportional value for positive cooperative games

Cited in

(5)

• Axiomatizations of the proportional division value
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1329120 (Why is no real title available?)
• Cohesive players: characterizations of a subclass of efficient, symmetric, and linear values
• Axioms on cohesive players and axiomatizations of the positively weighted Shapley values
• Cooperative games with unpaid players

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