The proportional value for positive cooperative games
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Publication:1574535
DOI10.1007/S001860050086zbMATH Open0956.91020OpenAlexW2024486119MaRDI QIDQ1574535FDOQ1574535
Authors: Karl Michael Ortmann 
Publication date: 10 August 2000
Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860050086
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