Pure bargaining problems and the Shapley rule
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- A CLASS OF MAJORITY GAMES
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- Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
- Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
- Cores of convex games
- Game theory
- Incentives, decentralized control, the assignment of joint costs and internal pricing
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
- Shared irrigation costs: An empirical and axiomatic analysis
- The bargaining problem
- The optimistic TU game in minimum cost spanning tree problems
- The proportional value for positive cooperative games
Cited in
(7)- A new allocation method for simple bargaining problems: the Shapley rule
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5251898 (Why is no real title available?)
- Sharing the surplus and proportional values
- Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 834589 (Why is no real title available?)
- Shapley Value vs. Proportional Rule in Cooperative Affairs
- Axiomatizations of the proportional division value
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