Pure bargaining problems and the Shapley rule
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Publication:4644774
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_36zbMATH Open1419.91315OpenAlexW2182659324MaRDI QIDQ4644774FDOQ4644774
Authors: Francesc Carreras, Guillermo Owen 
Publication date: 8 January 2019
Published in: Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_36
Recommendations
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cited In (7)
- A new allocation method for simple bargaining problems: the Shapley rule
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Sharing the surplus and proportional values
- Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Shapley Value vs. Proportional Rule in Cooperative Affairs
- Axiomatizations of the proportional division value
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