Egalitarianism in ordinal bargaining: the Shapley-Shubik rule

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.12.002zbMath1099.91012OpenAlexW2052731085MaRDI QIDQ1886750

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Publication date: 19 November 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.12.002

zbMATH Keywords

MonotonicityOrdinal invarianceBraceOrdinally normalized problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Nash bargaining in ordinal environments ⋮ A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule ⋮ The ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution for finite choice sets ⋮ Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives ⋮ A family of ordinal solutions to bargaining problems with many players

Cites Work

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• Monotonicity and independence axioms
• Axiomatic models of bargaining
• Ordinal invariance in multicoalitional bargaining.
• An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players.
• A note on ordinally equivalent Pareto surfaces
• A family of ordinal solutions to bargaining problems with many players
• The Bargaining Problem
• On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
• Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility

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