On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences

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Publication:4016227

DOI10.2307/2951543zbMath0767.90094OpenAlexW2043281928MaRDI QIDQ4016227

William Thomson, Ariel Rubinstein, Zvi Safra

Publication date: 9 December 1992

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951543




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