Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0178-zzbMath1213.91079OpenAlexW2115358187MaRDI QIDQ535400

Murat R. Sertel, Özgür Kıbrıs

Publication date: 11 May 2011

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0178-z

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains ⋮ Compromising as an equal loss principle ⋮ Negotiation strategies for agents with ordinal preferences: theoretical analysis and human study ⋮ Strategic voting in negotiating teams ⋮ The ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution for finite choice sets ⋮ On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules ⋮ Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games ⋮ Bargaining through approval

Cites Work

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• An axiomatization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution when the feasible sets can be finite
• The Bargaining Problem
• On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons

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