Recommendations
Cites work
- An axiomatization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution when the feasible sets can be finite
- Arbitration of two-party disputes under ignorance
- Axiomatic models of bargaining
- Egalitarianism in ordinal bargaining: the Shapley-Shubik rule
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1194806 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226098 (Why is no real title available?)
- Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite
- On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
- The bargaining problem
- The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
Cited in
(15)- On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules
- Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite
- Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
- Bargaining one-dimensional social choices
- Strategic voting in negotiating teams
- One-dimensional bargaining
- Compromising as an equal loss principle
- Negotiation strategies for agents with ordinal preferences: theoretical analysis and human study
- The ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution for finite choice sets
- A choice-functional characterization of welfarism
- Two principles for two-person social choice
- Arbiter assignment
- Bargaining through approval
- Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence
- Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games
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