Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0178-zzbMath1213.91079MaRDI QIDQ535400

Murat R. Sertel, Özgür Kıbrıs

Publication date: 11 May 2011

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0178-z

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A05: 2-person games

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Compromising as an equal loss principle, Negotiation strategies for agents with ordinal preferences: theoretical analysis and human study, The ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution for finite choice sets, Bargaining through approval, Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games, On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules, Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains, Strategic voting in negotiating teams

Cites Work

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