Compromising as an equal loss principle
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Publication:6172228
DOI10.1007/s10058-022-00302-wzbMath1519.91105MaRDI QIDQ6172228
Beatrice Napolitano, M. Remzi Sanver, Olivier Cailloux
Publication date: 16 August 2023
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
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