Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite

DOI10.1007/S003550050114MaRDI QIDQ2386282zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marco Mariotti

Publication date 22 August 2005

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050114

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(16)

• Price of fairness in two-agent single-machine scheduling problems
• Uncovered bargaining solutions
• Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives
• WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solutions for non-convex bargaining problems
• Compromising as an equal loss principle
• Bargaining through approval
• Negotiation strategies for agents with ordinal preferences: theoretical analysis and human study
• `Vintage' Nash bargaining without convexity
• Alternative characterizations of the proportional solution for nonconvex bargaining problems with claims
• A new two-party bargaining mechanism
• Some nonstandard features of bargaining problems
• Maximum latency scheduling problem on two-person cooperative games
• The ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution for finite choice sets
• An equitable Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining problems
• Rationality and solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: rationalizability and Nash solutions
• Nash bargaining for log-convex problems

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