Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite

DOI10.1007/s003550050114zbMath1066.91557OpenAlexW1984586926MaRDI QIDQ2386282

Marco Mariotti

Publication date: 22 August 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050114

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Rationality and solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: rationalizability and Nash solutions ⋮ Maximum latency scheduling problem on two-person cooperative games ⋮ `Vintage' Nash bargaining without convexity ⋮ WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solutions for non-convex bargaining problems ⋮ Compromising as an equal loss principle ⋮ Negotiation strategies for agents with ordinal preferences: theoretical analysis and human study ⋮ A new two-party bargaining mechanism ⋮ The ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution for finite choice sets ⋮ Price of fairness in two-agent single-machine scheduling problems ⋮ Uncovered bargaining solutions ⋮ Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives ⋮ Alternative characterizations of the proportional solution for nonconvex bargaining problems with claims ⋮ Bargaining through approval ⋮ An equitable Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining problems ⋮ SOME NONSTANDARD FEATURES OF BARGAINING PROBLEMS ⋮ Nash bargaining for log-convex problems

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