Negotiation strategies for agents with ordinal preferences: theoretical analysis and human study

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2023.104050MaRDI QIDQ6193096

Noam Hazon, Sarit Kraus, Ariel Rosenfeld, Sefi Erlich

Publication date: 13 February 2024

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

automated negotiationnegotiation strategieshuman studynegotiation with ordinal preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Individual preferences (91B08) Experimental studies (91A90) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)

Cites Work

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