The ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution for finite choice sets
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Publication:656807
DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0516-ZzbMATH Open1278.91070OpenAlexW2004943528MaRDI QIDQ656807FDOQ656807
Publication date: 13 January 2012
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0516-z
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Cited In (6)
- On stable solutions to the ordinal social choice problem
- A SIMPLE AXIOMATIZATION OF THE EGALITARIAN SOLUTION
- Bargaining through approval
- Characterization of the lexicographic egalitarian solution in the two-person bargaining problem
- Negotiation strategies for agents with ordinal preferences: theoretical analysis and human study
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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