A family of ordinal solutions to bargaining problems with many players

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.08.001zbMath1159.91316OpenAlexW2076396870WikidataQ57935130 ScholiaQ57935130MaRDI QIDQ1779841

Dov Samet, Zvi Safra

Publication date: 1 June 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

Bargaining solutionsOrdinal utilityBargaining problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (7)

Egalitarianism in ordinal bargaining: the Shapley-Shubik rule ⋮ Bargaining with ordinal and cardinal players ⋮ Nash bargaining in ordinal environments ⋮ A logic-based axiomatic model of bargaining ⋮ A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule ⋮ An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players. ⋮ The ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution for finite choice sets

Cites Work

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• Bargaining with an agenda
• An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players.
• A note on ordinally equivalent Pareto surfaces
• Egalitarianism in ordinal bargaining: the Shapley-Shubik rule
• The Bargaining Problem
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem

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