A Cardinal Characterization of the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson Axiomatic Bargaining Theory

DOI10.2307/2171730zbMath0837.90130OpenAlexW2079558722MaRDI QIDQ4859511

Simon Grant, Atsushi Kajii

Publication date: 6 February 1996

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.31822016676371

zbMATH Keywords

Nash solutionnon-expected utility preferencescardinal bargaining problemordinal bargaining problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (15)

Invariant risk attitudes ⋮ Appeals immune bargaining solution with variable alternative sets ⋮ On Nash's hidden assumption ⋮ On the redundancy of the implicit welfarist axiom in bargaining theory ⋮ Bargaining on monotonic social choice environments ⋮ Bargaining with subjective mixtures ⋮ The ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution for finite choice sets ⋮ Existence and uniqueness of ordinal Nash outcomes ⋮ The ordinal Nash social welfare function ⋮ Bargaining and boldness ⋮ Competitive equilibrium as a bargaining solution: an axiomatic approach ⋮ Constant risk aversion ⋮ The Nash bargaining solution for decision weight utility functions ⋮ Beyond Nash bargaining theory: The Nash set ⋮ A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility

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