A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility
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Publication:1867828
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00009-4zbMATH Open1027.91008MaRDI QIDQ1867828FDOQ1867828
Authors: Oscar Volij
Publication date: 2 April 2003
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- The bargaining problem
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- A course in game theory.
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
- Existence and dynamic consistency of Nash equilibrium with non-expected utility preferences
- Equilibrium without independence
- Time Preference
- Epistemic conditions for equilibrium in beliefs without independence
- On risk aversion and bargaining outcomes.
- Bargaining solutions without the expected utility hypothesis
- On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences
- Two-Stage Lotteries without the Reduction Axiom
- "Making Book Against Oneself," The Independence Axiom, and Nonlinear Utility Theory
- Existence and uniqueness of ordinal Nash outcomes
- A Cardinal Characterization of the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson Axiomatic Bargaining Theory
- Bargaining and boldness
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