A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility
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Cites work
- "Making Book Against Oneself," The Independence Axiom, and Nonlinear Utility Theory
- A Cardinal Characterization of the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson Axiomatic Bargaining Theory
- A course in game theory.
- Bargaining and boldness
- Bargaining solutions without the expected utility hypothesis
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
- Epistemic conditions for equilibrium in beliefs without independence
- Equilibrium without independence
- Existence and dynamic consistency of Nash equilibrium with non-expected utility preferences
- Existence and uniqueness of ordinal Nash outcomes
- On risk aversion and bargaining outcomes.
- On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- The bargaining problem
- Time Preference
- Two-Stage Lotteries without the Reduction Axiom
Cited in
(5)- A note on dynamic transfer price bargaining
- A non-cooperative bargaining game with risk averse players and an uncertain finite horizon
- Delayed agreements and nonexpected utility
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 836597 (Why is no real title available?)
- The sugar-pie game: the case of non-conforming expectations
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