A non-cooperative bargaining game with risk averse players and an uncertain finite horizon
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:899726)
Recommendations
Cites work
- A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining
- Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's Theories
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614533 (Why is no real title available?)
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- The bargaining problem
Cited in
(8)- The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval
- A class of risk-sensitive noncooperative games
- Uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in the stochastic model of bargaining
- Stochastic Superiority Equilibrium in Game Theory
- Misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining: Pure exchange and public good economies
- Finite horizon bargaining with outside options and threat points
- Bargaining games with a random sequence of who makes the offers
- The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority
This page was built for publication: A non-cooperative bargaining game with risk averse players and an uncertain finite horizon
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q899726)