Uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in the stochastic model of bargaining

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2019.108931MaRDI QIDQ2300348zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Kirill Evdokimov

Publication date 27 February 2020

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108931

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionstochastic bargainingunanimity ruleuniqueness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• UNIQUE EQUILIBRIA IN THE RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING MODEL WHEN THE PAYOFF SET IS NON-CONVEX
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model with risk-averse players
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
• Bargaining with stochastic disagreement payoffs
• Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining

Cites work

• A non-cooperative bargaining game with risk averse players and an uncertain finite horizon
• A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining
• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
• A Structural Model of Government Formation
• Legislative bargaining with a stochastic surplus and costly~recognition
• Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
• The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority
• The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model with risk-averse players

Cited in

(9)

• Replication invariance of bargaining solutions
• Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
• On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• UNIQUE EQUILIBRIA IN THE RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING MODEL WHEN THE PAYOFF SET IS NON-CONVEX
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model with risk-averse players
• On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria
• On the equilibrium uniqueness in noncooperative n-person games

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