Bargaining solutions without the expected utility hypothesis

DOI10.1006/game.1993.1017zbMath0776.90094OpenAlexW2033815469WikidataQ57918041 ScholiaQ57918041MaRDI QIDQ2367160

Itzhak Zilcha, Zvi Safra

Publication date: 28 November 1993

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1017

zbMATH Keywords

nonexpected utilitystep-by-step processNash's axiomsstatus quo point

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (12)

Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining ⋮ The effect of decision weights in bargaining problems. ⋮ Bargaining with subjective mixtures ⋮ Existence and uniqueness of ordinal Nash outcomes ⋮ Divide the dollar and conquer more: sequential bargaining and risk aversion ⋮ Nash's bargaining solution when the disagreement point is random ⋮ Bargaining and boldness ⋮ Insurance bargaining under ambiguity ⋮ Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining game with loss aversion ⋮ On risk aversion and bargaining outcomes. ⋮ A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility

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