Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion
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Publication:712470
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2011.10.010zbMATH Open1248.91041OpenAlexW2021747705MaRDI QIDQ712470FDOQ712470
Authors: Bram Driesen, Andres Perea, Hans Peters
Publication date: 16 October 2012
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/1550510/guid-bb24a5db-4838-4583-8f60-a0750afe4fb5-ASSET1.0.pdf
Recommendations
- Loss aversion and bargaining
- Alternating-offer bargaining with endogenous commitment
- BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND ALTERNATING-OFFER BARGAINING
- Alternating offers in economic environments
- The alternating offer bargaining method under uncertainty
- Alternating-offer bargaining and common knowledge of rationality
- Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information
- Commitment in alternating offers bargaining
- Emergence and nonemergence of alternating offers in bilateral bargaining
- Endogeneity of alternating offers in a bargaining game
Cites Work
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- A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
- Bargaining with history-dependent preferences
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- Loss aversion and bargaining
- The one-shot-deviation principle for sequential rationality
- A preference foundation for constant loss aversion
- Repeated bargaining with reference-dependent preferences
- A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining
- Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents.
- WAGE NEGOTIATION UNDER GOOD FAITH BARGAINING
Cited In (20)
- Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence
- Credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibrium for bimatrix games with triangular fuzzy payoffs
- BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND ALTERNATING-OFFER BARGAINING
- Loss aversion and bargaining
- On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results
- Endogenous reference points in bargaining
- Bargaining over losses
- Incomplete information about social preferences explains equal division and delay in bargaining
- Alternating-offer bargaining with endogenous commitment
- A tale of two bargaining solutions
- Commitment in alternating offers bargaining
- Subgame perfect equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining game with loss aversion
- Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining
- Malice in the Rubinstein bargaining game
- Power or loss aversion? Reinterpreting the bargaining weights in search and matching models
- Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation
- Equilibrium notions for agents with cumulative prospect theory preferences
- Non-acceptance of Losses—An Experimental Study on the Importance of the Sign of Final Outcomes in Ultimatum Bargaining
- The willingness-to-accept/willingness-to-pay disparity in repeated markets: loss aversion or ``bad-deal aversion?
- Loss aversion in sequential auctions
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