Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion
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Publication:712470
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.010zbMath1248.91041OpenAlexW2021747705MaRDI QIDQ712470
Bram Driesen, Andrés Perea, H. J. M. Peters
Publication date: 16 October 2012
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/1550510/guid-bb24a5db-4838-4583-8f60-a0750afe4fb5-ASSET1.0.pdf
Related Items (10)
Endogenous reference points in bargaining ⋮ Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence ⋮ Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining ⋮ A tale of two bargaining solutions ⋮ On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results ⋮ Credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibrium for bimatrix games with triangular fuzzy payoffs ⋮ Equilibrium Notions for Agents with Cumulative Prospect Theory Preferences ⋮ Alternating-offer bargaining with endogenous commitment ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining game with loss aversion ⋮ Incomplete information about social preferences explains equal division and delay in bargaining
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